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  OPINION OF THE COURT 
            
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiffs Michael J. Whittle and James Calandrillo 
appeal from the summary judgment granted to the defendants in 
this action under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 185.  The district court held that plaintiff-appellants' 
hybrid duty of fair representation claim was time-barred.  We 
will reverse. 
 I. 
 This case involves a seniority dispute brought about 
when defendant Yellow Freight System, Inc. began to reorganize 
its New Jersey terminal operations.  Appellants were originally 
hired to work in Yellow's Carlstadt terminal, where they were 
represented by Teamsters Local 641.  Later, Yellow opened its 
Little Falls terminal, staffing it with employees from Carlstadt 
and another terminal in Rockaway.  Positions at Little Falls were 
filled in accordance with the change of operations procedure 
contained in the National Master Freight Agreement, which 
provides for staffing new terminals on the basis of seniority. 
 Appellants wished to follow the work and transfer to 
the Little Falls terminal, believing that their employment 
opportunities would be greater at the new facility.  
Unfortunately, they did not have sufficient seniority to bid for 
jobs at Little Falls.  They approached the union's business 
agent, John Barnes, requesting that he help arrange a transfer.  
Barnes discussed the matter with company representative Jack 
Hall, who initially expressed reservations about allowing 
appellants to transfer, believing that it might eventually lead 
  
to a seniority dispute.  Nevertheless, Yellow did allow 
appellants to transfer to Little Falls, on condition that they 
execute an agreement under which the appellants would retain 
their company seniority for noncompetitive benefits such as 
health insurance and the pension plan, but would be assigned a 
new terminal seniority date for the allocation of all benefits 
for which workers compete, such as assignment of work. 
 This arrangement apparently worked satisfactorily until 
Yellow opened another terminal in Pine Brook, New Jersey and 
closed its Little Falls facility.  Yellow planned to staff the 
Pine Brook terminal with employees from Little Falls and 
Rockaway, and this evidently made appellants apprehensive about 
their seniority vis-a-vis the Rockaway employees.  They met with 
Barnes and inquired whether their full seniority would be 
restored after the move to Pine Brook.  Barnes offered no 
comfort, however, taking the position that the agreement 
appellants signed in 1988 worked a permanent forfeiture of their 
Carlstadt seniority. 
 Although appellants knew that employees from Rockaway 
with less company seniority had been placed higher on the Pine 
Brook competitive seniority list,1 they waited until December 7, 
1990 before grieving.  Barnes then brought the matter to 
                     
 
    1Appellants assert on appeal that they noticed for the first 
time in December 1990 that the Rockaway employees had greater 
competitive seniority.  They have provided no citation to the 
record to support their assertion, hence we will disregard it. 
  
arbitration.  On March 26, 1991, the Joint Local Committee of 
North Jersey held a hearing, at which Barnes merely explained to 
the Committee "exactly how everything happened" regarding the 
seniority and transfers.  Appellants were present at the hearing, 
but did not dispute or add to anything Barnes said.  Although the 
grievance was not filed until eleven months after appellants' 
January 2, 1990 transfer to Pine Brook, Yellow never asserted at 
the hearing that the grievance was untimely.  The Committee ruled 
against appellants the day of the hearing, mailing a written 
confirmation on May 2, 1991. 
   On September 25, 1991, appellants filed this hybrid 
suit under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 185.  They alleged that Yellow's action with respect to their 
seniority violated the collective bargaining agreement and that 
Local 641's failure to prosecute their cause vigorously before 
the Joint Local Committee breached the union's duty of fair 
representation. 
 The district court granted summary judgment to 
appellees, holding that appellants' suit was time-barred.  After 
concluding that their cause of action accrued on January 2, 1990, 
it reasoned that appellants' failure to file either a grievance 
or a legal action within six months of that date made their 
federal suit untimely.  Relying on Benson v. General Motors 
Corp., 716 F.2d 862 (11th Cir. 1983), the court held that the 
  
limitations period begins to run when the employee knew or should 
have known of the loss of seniority.  We disagree. 
 
 
 II. 
 For limitation of actions, a cause accrues when it is 
sufficiently ripe that one can maintain suit on it.  Skyberg v. 
United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 5 F.3d 297, 301 
(8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Santos v. District Council of United 
Bhd. of Carpenters, 619 F.2d 963, 968-69 (2d Cir. 1980)); City of 
Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 
1993); Ghartey v. St. John's Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 163 (2d 
Cir. 1989).  Accordingly, the six-month limitations period for 
this action could have run only if appellants were entitled to 
file their suit on January 2, 1990. 
 The Benson plaintiffs agreed to cede their existing 
seniority in exchange for "preferential consideration" at another 
General Motors plant.  They transferred to the other facility, 
but received no preferential treatment and were soon laid off.  
They then filed a hybrid suit against their employer and their 
union.  Because the collective bargaining agreement required that 
seniority lists be posted, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that the limitations period started to run as soon as the 
list was posted and the employees knew they had lost seniority.  
716 F.2d at 864.  Significantly, however, the seniority dispute 
  
in Benson was neither grieved nor arbitrated, because both 
parties took the position that the matter was not arbitrable.  
See Benson v. General Motors Corp., 539 F. Supp. 55, 56 (N.D. 
Ala. 1981), vacated, 716 F.2d 862 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 When a grievance procedure does apply, the employee-
plaintiff is required to at least attempt to exhaust his or her 
remedies under that procedure before a § 301 suit can be filed 
against the employer.  DelCostello v. International Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 2290 (1983); 
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652, 85 S. Ct. 614, 
616 (1965).  Here, the union did not arbitrarily refuse to press 
appellants' grievance, but pursued it to arbitration, which the 
employees lost.  Hence, there was no way for the employees to 
know whether they suffered any loss from the union's alleged 
breach until the arbitration decision was issued.  It is possible 
that appellants could have won the arbitration, even if the 
union's zeal fell below the horizon of fair representation owed 
them.  See Lucas v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 909 F.2d 419, 
421 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Ghartey, 869 F.2d at 163.  
Here, appellants' claim accrued when the adverse arbitration 
decision was reached.  See Childs v. Pennsylvania Fed'n Bhd. of 
Maintenance of Way Employees, 831 F.2d 429, 436 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(Railway Labor Act); Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520, 
1522-23 & n.3 (11th Cir. 1985); cf. Vadino v. A. Valey Eng'rs, 
903 F.2d 253, 261 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Allowing the section 301 claim 
  
to be tolled until the unfair representation claim also accrues 
is consistent with the congressional goal of resolving labor 
disputes in the first instance through the collectively bargained 
grievance procedure. . . ."). 
 In Hayes, bargaining unit employees voted to combine 
two job classifications and, as a result, plaintiff was laid off.  
He pursued his grievance through the preliminary stages of the 
grievance procedure, then later requested the union to take the 
matter to arbitration.  Three months after his layoff, the union 
voted not to arbitrate plaintiff's grievance.  769 F.2d at 1521.  
The district court held that appellant's § 301 suit accrued "when 
the merger of the seniority rosters became effective and 
certainly no later than plaintiff's termination[,]" noting that 
the seniority lists had been posted on or before his layoff.  Id. 
at 1522.  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 
limitations period began to run on the day the union notified 
plaintiff it would not arbitrate.  Id.  The court distinguished 
its earlier decision in Benson by pointing out that in Benson 
there was no applicable grievance procedure.  Id. at 1523 n.3. 
 We conclude that appellants' cause of action accrued no 
earlier than March 26, 1991, the date of the adverse arbitration 
decision.  Because their complaint was filed on September 25, 
1991, it was timely.2 
                     
     
2This conclusion also dispenses with appellee's argument 
that appellants' failure to file their grievance within six 
months makes their lawsuit untimely.  Timeliness is a procedural 
  
 
 III. 
 Because the district court erred when it found 
appellants' suit to be time-barred, we will reverse its judgment 
and remand the cause for proceedings on the merits. 
(..continued) 
issue, and in an arbitration proceeding, procedural issues are 
for the arbitrator to decide.  See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. 
Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557, 84 S. Ct. 909, 918 (1964); Troy 
Chem. Corp. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 408, 37 F.3d 123, 126-27 
(3d Cir. 1994) (applying Association of Flight Attendants v. 
USAir, Inc., 960 F.2d 345, 349 (3d Cir. 1992)).  Likewise, in a 
judicial proceeding, the legal issues surrounding the timeliness 
issue are matters of law for the court.  Appellants' delay in 
filing their arbitration, while a matter of legitimate concern 
before the arbitrator, simply has no bearing on whether they 
timely filed the § 301 suit. 
